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A.	  About	  the	  Legal	  Concept	  of	  Human	  Dignity	  
	  
Human	   existence	   and	   dignity,	   just	   like	   human	   unity	   itself,	   are	   not	   actually	   rights.	   The	  
essence	  of	  humanity,	   as	   regards	   the	   law,	   is	   inaccessible.	  Because	  of	   this,	  human	   life	  and	  
dignity	  are	   included	   in	  the	  catalogue	  of	  human	  rights	  and	   in	  modern	  constitutions	  as	  the	  
sources	  of	  rights,	  as	  inviolable	  values	  beyond	  the	  law.	  The	  law	  must	  guarantee	  that	  these	  
inviolable	  values	  are	  respected	  and	  protected.1	  
	  
Under	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Alkotmánybíróság	   (Hungarian	   Constitutional	   Court;	  
hereinafter	  referred	  to	  as	  Constitutional	  Court),	  the	  right	  to	  human	  dignity	  is	  the	  “mother	  
right”	   of	   all	   other	   individual	   rights	   and,	   thus,	   the	   source	   of	   all	   other	   specific	   individual	  
rights	   (Decision	  No.	   8/1990	   (IV.	   23.)	   AB2).	  Human	  dignity	   is	   a	   paramount	   value,	  which	   is	  
unapproachable	  and	  inaccessible	  for	  the	  law.	  The	  law	  cannot	  define	  human	  dignity,	  cannot	  
summarize	   all	   of	   its	   sub-­‐elements,	   and	   cannot	   grasp	   its	   essence	   in	   a	   technical	   sense;	  
however,	  the	  law	  can	  protect	  human	  dignity	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  detailed	  definition.	  	  
	  
The	  background	  of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  philosophy	   in	  describing	   the	  content	  of	   the	  
right	  consists	  of	  the	  ideology	  of	  Christian	  natural	  law	  and	  Kantian	  moral	  philosophy.	  Behind	  
the	   Constitutional	   Court’s	  monistic	   view	   of	  man	   and	   the	   “indivisibility	   doctrine”	   lies	   the	  
concept	   of	   the	   Christian	   world	   view,	   according	   to	   which	  man	   is	   the	   image	   of	   God,	   and	  
man’s	  personal	  spiritual	  soul	  is	  the	  unique	  work	  of	  God’s	  creation.	  	  
	  	  	  
Human	  dignity	  is	  the	  principal	  constitutional	  guiding	  principle	  for	  the	  creation	  and	  
application	  of	   all	   laws	  and	   the	  actual	   foundation	  of	   the	   system	  of	   constitutional	  
fundamental	  rights,	  values	  and	  obligations.	  [Decision	  No.	  37/2011	  (V.	  10)	  AB].	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1	  Decision	  No.	  23/1990	   (X.	   31)	  AB	  of	   the	  Constitutional	  Court,	   Concurring	  opinions	  of	   Tamás	   Lábady	  and	  Ödön	  
Tersztyánszky.	  
2	  The	  first	  number	  of	  the	  decisions’	  notation	  stands	  for	   its	   line	  number,	  the	  second	  for	  the	  year	   in	  which	  it	  was	  
brought.	   In	   brackets,	   the	   month	   and	   the	   day	   of	   its	   publication	   appear.	   “AB”	   is	   the	   abbreviation	   for	   the	  
Constitutional	  Court.	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As	  such,	  the	  right	  to	  human	  dignity,	  together	  with	  the	  right	  to	  life,	  is	  the	  absolute	  limit	  of	  
the	   restriction	   of	   all	   other	   fundamental	   rights.	   It	   is	   the	   untouchable	   essence	   within	   the	  
essential	   content.	   The	   Constitutional	   Court	   connected	   the	   concept	   of	   essential	   content	  
with	  the	  concept	  of	  human	  dignity,	  creating	  an	  absolute	  limit	  as	  regards	  the	  constitutional	  
scrutiny	   of	   the	   restriction	   of	   fundamental	   rights.	   [Decision	   No.	   23/1990	   (X.	   31)	   AB].	  
Connecting	   the	   right	   to	   human	   dignity	   and	   the	   essential	   contents	   of	   fundamental	   rights	  
made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	   regards	  the	  system	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  a	  
value	   system.	   Its	   starting	   point	  was	   the	   theoretical	   consideration	   that	   the	  Constitution’s	  
system	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  is	  not	  the	  aggregation	  of	  sporadic	  or	  isolated	  rights,	  but	  it	  is	  
an	   integral	   whole,	   the	   foundation	   and	   source	   of	   which	   is	   the	   right	   to	   human	   dignity.	  
Ultimately,	  every	  right	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  and	  other	  rights	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  human	  
dignity.	   In	   other	   words,	   fundamental	   rights	   are	   interwoven	   with	   and	   presuppose	   one	  
another,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  matter	  which	   fundamental	   right	   is	  at	   issue;	   there	   is	  an	  absolute	  
limit	  to	  their	  restriction.3	  
	  
One	  of	   the	   functions	  of	   the	   right	   to	  human	  dignity	   is	   to	  guarantee	  autonomy,	  as	  human	  
dignity	   “is	   the	   seed	   of	   individual	   self-­‐determination	   free	   from	   any	   other	   person’s	   will,	  
which	  ensures	  that	  .	  .	  .	  that	  the	  person	  can	  remain	  an	  individual	  and	  does	  not	  become	  an	  
instrument	  or	  object.”	  [Decision	  No.	  8/1990	  (IV.	  23)	  AB].	  The	  other	  function	  of	  the	  right	  is	  
to	  guarantee	  equality	  by	  ensuring	  that	  everybody	  has	  an	  equal	  right	  to	  dignity.	  According	  
to	   the	  Constitutional	   Court’s	   interpretation,	   it	   also	   follows	   from	   the	  mother	   right	   nature	  
that	  human	  dignity	  is:	  
	  
[S]uch	  a	  subsidiary	  right	  that	  both	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  other	  courts	  
may	  invoke	  it	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  individual’s	  autonomy	  if	  none	  of	  the	  
concrete,	   specific	   fundamental	   rights	  can	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  specific	   facts	  of	  
the	  given	  case.	  [Decision	  No.	  8/1990	  (IV.	  23)	  AB]	  
	  
Human	  dignity	   is	  only	  unrestrictable	   in	  connection	  and	  forming	  a	  whole	  with	  the	  right	  to	  
life	  (see	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  death	  penalty,	  abortion,	  and	  euthanasia).	  If	   it	   is	  separated	  from	  
the	   right	   to	   life,	   the	   individual	   partial	   licenses	  deriving	   from	   it	   can	   already	  be	   restricted.	  
Reputation,	   integrity	  and	  human	  dignity	  are	  personal	   rights	  which	  may	  be	  separated	  but	  
which	  are	  closely	  connected	  with	  each	  other.	  Reputation	  and	  integrity	  (or	  honor)	  protect	  
the	  social	  value	  judgment	  formed	  of	  a	  person.	  Article	  78	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Civil	  Code	  (Act	  IV	  
of	   1959)	   protects	   against	   defamation	   and	   prohibits	   the	   statement	   and	   dissemination	   of	  
false	   facts	   or	   the	   misrepresentation	   of	   true	   facts	   that	   would	   be	   injurious	   to	   another	  
person.	  The	  Civil	  Code	  also	  protects	  the	  right	  to	  integrity	  (or	  honor)	  and	  includes	  the	  right	  
                                            
3	   Zsolt	   Balogh,	   Alapjogi	   tesztek	   az	   Alkotmánybíróság	   gyakorlatában	   (Fundamental	   Rights	   Tests	   in	   the	  
Jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court),	  in	  A	  MEGTALÁLT	  ALKOTMÁNY?	  A	  MAGYAR	  ALAPJOGI	  BÍRÁSKODÁS	  ELSŐ	  KILENC	  ÉVE	  
(Constitution	   Found?	   The	   First	  Nine	   Years	   of	  Hungarian	   Fundamental	   Rights	   Jurisprudence)	   124	   (Gábor	  Halmai	  
ed.,	  2000)	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to	  human	  dignity	  (Article	  76),	  but	  civil	  court	  jurisprudence	  does	  not	  attribute	  independent	  
meaning	  to	  the	  latter;	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  it	  regards	  integrity	  identical	  with	  human	  dignity.	  	  
	  
Pursuant	  to	  Article	  179	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Criminal	  Code	  (Act	  IV	  of	  1978),	  the	  publication	  of	  
any	  facts	  capable	  of	  undermining	  integrity	  (or	  honor)	  may	  substantiate	  the	  commission	  of	  
the	  offence	  of	  libel,	  and	  Article	  180	  prohibits—in	  addition	  to	  certain	  other	  conditions—the	  
use	  of	  statements	  capable	  of	  undermining	  integrity	  (the	  offence	  of	  slander).	  The	  Civil	  Code	  
does	  not	  expressly	  cover	  human	  dignity,	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  here	  also,	  the	  jurisprudence	  
views	   it	   as	   identical	   to	   the	   right	   to	   integrity.	   Human	   dignity	   thus	   has	   no	   independent	  
meaning	  or	  content,	  either	  in	  civil	  or	  criminal	  law.	  	  
	  
	  
B.	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Dignity	  and	  Freedom	  of	  the	  Press	  in	  Europe	  
	  
The	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  is	  not	  merely	  one	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  European	  media	  
regulation	  but	  also	  one	  of	   the	  bases	  of	   the	  common	  European	   legal	  order.4	  According	   to	  
McCrudden,	   the	  concept	  of	  human	  dignity	  differs	   from	   legal	   system	  to	   legal	   system,	  and	  
sometimes	   it	  can	  mean	  different	  things	  even	  within	  the	  same	  legal	  system;	  nevertheless,	  
human	  dignity	  has	  a	  special	  significance	  in	  ruling	  on	  cases	  concerning	  human	  rights.5	  
	  	  
The	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	   in	  television	  broadcasting	   is	  prescribed	  by	  the	  television	  
broadcasting	   convention	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe:	   “[a]ll	   items	  of	  programme	  services,	  as	  
concerns	  their	  presentation	  and	  content,	  shall	  respect	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  human	  being	  and	  
the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  others.”6	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  in	  
the	  common	  European	  media	  regulation	  appears	  primarily	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  prohibition	  of	  
hate	   speech	   in	   audiovisual	  media	   services.7	  With	   respect	   to	   audiovisual	   services	   and	   the	  
Internet,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council	  have	  formulated	  a	  recommendation	  in	  
order	  to	  protect	  human	  dignity	  more	  effectively.8	  
	  
                                            
4	   PERRY	   KELLER,	   EUROPEAN	   AND	   INTERNATIONAL	   MEDIA	   LAW.	   LIBERAL	   DEMOCRACY,	   TRADE	   AND	   THE	   NEW	   MEDIA	   135–139	  
(2011).	  
5	  Christopher	  McCrudden,	  Human	  Dignity	  and	   Judicial	   Interpretation	  of	  Human	  Rights,	   19	  EUR.	   J.	  OF	   INT’L	   L.	  655	  
(2008).	  
6	  The	  European	  Convention	  on	  Transfrontier	  Television,	  adopted	  on	  5	  May	  1989,	  was	  promulgated	  in	  Hungary	  by	  
Article	  7(1)	  of	  Act	  XLIX	  of	  1998.	  
7	   Directive	   2010/13/EU	   on	   audiovisual	   media	   services,	   Art.	   6.	   See	   more	   on	   this	   in	   Tarlach	   MCGONAGLE,	  
Safeguarding	  Human	  Dignity	  in	  the	  European	  Audiovisual	  Sector,	  6	  IRIS	  PLUS,	  LEGAL	  OBSERVATIONS	  OF	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  
AUDIOVISUAL	  OBSERVATORY	  (2007).	  
8	  Recommendation	  No.	  2006/952/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  20	  December	  2006	  on	  the	  
protection	   of	   minors	   and	   human	   dignity	   and	   on	   the	   right	   of	   reply	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  
European	  audiovisual	  and	  on-­‐line	  information	  services	  industry.	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The	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  is	  part	  of	  the	  media	  regulations	  of	  a	  number	  of	  European	  
countries	   (France,	   Luxembourg,	   Italy,	   Portugal,	   Slovakia,	   Slovenia,	   Cyprus,	   Romania,	   the	  
Czech	  Republic,	  Greece	  and	  Spain).	  It	  is	  characteristic	  of	  these	  regulations	  that	  they	  include	  
the	   protection	   of	   human	   dignity	   as	   the	   alternative	   to	   the	   violation	   of	   reputation	   and	  
integrity,	  or	  sometimes	  they	  are	  included	  in	  the	  regulations	  as	  provisions	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
reputation	   and	   integrity	   causes	   of	   action.	   They	   chose	   different	   approaches	   than	   in	   the	  
Hungarian	  regulation,	  which	  regulates	  the	  issue	  of	  personality	  violations	  committed	  in	  the	  
media	  as	  part	  of	  the	  general	  personality	  protection	  regime	  (Civil	  and	  Criminal	  Code),	  and	  it	  
does	  not	   incorporate	  the	  protection	  of	  personal	  rights	   in	  the	  media	  regulations.	  This	  also	  
means	   that,	   in	   these	   states,	   the	   media	   authorities	   may	   initiate	   proceedings	   in	   cases	   of	  
violations	   of	   dignity	   (reputation	   and	   integrity).9	   Another	   solution—which	   is	   also	   used	   in	  
Hungarian	  media	  regulation,	  in	  Article	  14(2)	  of	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act10—is	  when	  the	  law	  
prohibits	  specific	  conduct	  violating	  human	  dignity.11	  
	  
The	   regulation	  of	   the	  European	   states	   shows	  a	   colorful	  picture,	   and	   in	   the	   light	  of	   these	  
laws—as	   well	   as	   being	   mindful	   of	   the	   debate	   surrounding	   the	   Hungarian	   media	  
regulations—it	  can	  be	  stated	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  regulations	  and	  jurisprudence	  are	  special,	  
and	  its	  unique	  solution	  may	  carry	  European	  level	  lessons.	  
	  
	  
C.	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Dignity	  in	  Hungarian	  Media	  Regulations	  
	  
Article	   3(2)	   of	   the	   Radio	   and	   Television	   Broadcasting	   Act,	   in	   effect	   from	   1996	   until	   1	  
January	  2011,	  stated	  that	  “Broadcasters	  are	  obligated	  to	  respect	   the	  constitutional	  order	  
of	   the	  Republic	   of	  Hungary,	   and	   their	   activities	   shall	   not	   violate	   human	   rights.”	   The	   rule	  
applied	   exclusively	   to	   “broadcasters,”	   and	   therefore	   (according	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  
                                            
9	  This	   is	  how	  the	  French	   (Article	  1	  of	   the	  Freedom	  of	  Communication	  Act	  no.	  86-­‐1067),	   Luxembourgish	   (Article	  
1(2)(c)	  of	  act	  of	  27	  July	  1991	  on	  Electronic	  Media),	  Italian	  (Legislative	  Decree	  31	  July	  2005,	  no.	  177;	  Articles	  3–4	  of	  
the	   Audiovisual	   Media	   and	   Radio	   Services	   Code),	   Portuguese	   (Law	   no.	   27/2007	   of	   July	   30;	   Article	   27	   of	   the	  
Television	  and	  On-­‐Demand	  Audiovisual	  Services	  Law,	  Law	  no.	  54/2010	  of	  December	  24;	  Articles	  30	  and	  32	  of	  the	  
Radio	  Law),	  Slovakian	  (Article	  19	  of	  Act	  no.	  308/2000	  Coll.	  on	  Broadcasting	  and	  Retransmission),	  Slovenian	  (Article	  
6	   of	   Media	   Act	   no	   35/2001),	   Cypriot	   (Article	   33(1)	   of	   the	   Radio	   and	   Television	   Stations	   Law	   of	   1998)	   and	  
Romanian	  (Law	  no.	  504/July	  11th,	  2002;	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Audiovisual	  Law)	  law	  regulate	  the	  issue	  with	  respect	  to	  
media	  services	  and	  the	  Italian	  (Id.)	  and	  Slovenian	  (Id.)	  with	  respect	  to	  press	  products.	  (We	  use	  the	  title	  of	  foreign	  
laws	  and	  regulations	  in	  English	  in	  every	  case.)	  
10	  Act	  CIV	  of	  2010	  on	  the	  Freedom	  of	  the	  Press	  and	  the	  Fundamental	  Rules	  of	  Media	  Content.	  
11	  Similarly	   to	   their	  Hungarian	  counterpart,	   the	  Czech	   (Article	  32	  of	  Act	  no.	  231/2001	  Coll.,	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  
radio	  and	  television	  broadcasting)	  and	  Portuguese	  (Law	  No.	  1/99;	  Journalist	  Statute)	  regulations	  prohibit	  people	  
being	  portrayed	  in	  vulnerable	  situations,	  and	  the	  latter	  also	  prohibits	  such	  depictions	  of	  children	  that	  violate	  their	  
dignity	   (Id.,	   Article	   14).	   The	   violation	   of	   human	   dignity	   is	   prohibited	   in	   advertisements	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Czech	  
(Article	   2	  of	  Act	   no.	   40/1995	  Coll.,	   on	   the	   regulation	  of	   advertising),	  Greek	   (Article	   3	  of	   Law	  2328/1995	   “Legal	  
regime	  of	  private	  television	  and	  local	  radio	  broadcasters,	  regulation	  of	  relevant	  market	  and	  other	  provisions”)	  and	  
Spanish	  (Article	  57	  General	  Audiovisual	  Law	  7/2010)	  media	  regulations.	  
2013]	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currently	  effective	  law)	  to	  linear	  audiovisual	  and	  radio	  media	  services,	  and	  the	  law	  did	  not	  
specify	  the	  fundamental	  right	  of	  human	  dignity.	  	  
	  	  	  The	   Constitutional	   Court	   considered	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   human	  
rights	   (and	  within	   those,	   human	   dignity)	   in	   Decision	   No.	   46/2007	   (VI.	   27)	   AB	   under	   the	  
media	  regulations	  and	  held	  that	  	  
	  
[I]f	   a	   broadcaster	   violates	   an	   individual	   right,	   the	   aggrieved	   person	   may	  
decide	   whether	   to	   enforce	   their	   individual	   rights	   against	   the	   broadcaster	  
having	   committed	   the	   violation,	   for	   example,	   by	   filing	   a	   court	   action.	   In	  
addition	  to	  judicial	  action,	  Articles	  112(1)	  and	  136(1)	  of	  the	  Media	  Act	  [Radio	  
and	   Television	   Broadcasting	  Act]	   provides	   for	   administrative	   remedies.	   The	  
Országos	   Rádió	   és	   Televízió	   Testület12	   (	   National	   Radio	   and	   Television	  
Commission;	   hereinafter	   referred	   to	   as	   “NRTC”)—proceeding	   pursuant	   to	  
Article	  3(1)	  of	  the	  Media	  Act	  [Radio	  and	  Television	  Broadcasting	  Act]—does	  
not	  decide	  on	  the	  violation	  of	   the	  rights	  of	   individual	   legal	  entities	   in	   these	  
administrative	   proceedings.	   Article	   3(1)	   of	   the	   Media	   Act	   [Radio	   and	  
Television	   Broadcasting	   Act]	   is	   a	   provision	   of	   principle.	   Accordingly,	   during	  
the	  administrative	  proceedings	  the	  NRTC	  is	  entitled	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  
broadcaster	   carries	   out	   its	   activities	   while	   respecting	   human	   rights,	   and	  
whether	   the	   subject-­‐matter,	   nature	   and	   perspective	   of	   its	   individual	  
programmes	  violate	  fundamental	  values	  embodied	  in	  human	  rights.	  
	  
The	   expression	   “fundamental	   values	   manifesting	   in	   human	   rights”	   in	   the	   Constitutional	  
Court’s	  decision	  may	  be	  interpreted	  in	  more	  than	  one	  way.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  if,	  based	  on	  this,	  
any	   values	   (basis)	   standing	   behind	   any	   human	   rights	   may	   provide	   a	   reason	   for	  
administrative	  proceedings,	  and	  it	  is	  unclarified	  what	  we	  regard	  as	  values	  standing	  behind	  
human	  rights	  and	  if	  these	  could	  be	  included	  in	  the	  judicial	  practice.	  It	  is	  surmised	  that	  the	  
text	  quoted	  wished	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  task	  for	  the	  media	  regulations	  is	  to	  safeguard	  the	  
institution	   of	   human	   rights,	   in	   other	   words,	   it	   protects	   an	   institution	   indispensably	  
important	   for	   society	   and	   not	   the	   person	   that	   suffered	   actual	   injuries	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
violation	  of	  human	  rights	  (see	  more	  in	  D.	  I.).	  
	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   in	   this	   decision	  
also	  stated	  that:	  
	  
[A]n	   important	   element—among	   others—is	   the	   right	   of	   the	   person	   to	  
enforce	   their	   subjective	   rights	   covered	   by	   the	   claim	   before	   various	   state	  
authorities,	  as	  such	   including	   the	  courts	  as	  well.	  However,	   the	  right	   to	  self-­‐
determination	   also	   includes—as	   a	   general	   right	   to	   act—the	   right	   to	   refrain	  
from	  enforcing	  claims	  or	  to	  non-­‐action.	  Since	  this	  right	  is	  intended	  to	  protect	  
                                            
12	  Former	  Hungarian	  media	  authority	  (1996-­‐2010).	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the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   individual,	   in	   general	   everyone	   is	   free	   to	   decide	  
whether	   to	   enforce	   claims	   by	   way	   of	   the	   administrative	   proceedings	  
available	   under	   the	   Constitution	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   rights	   and	   lawful	  
interests,	  or	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  so.	  [Decision	  No.	  1/1994	  (I.	  7)	  AB]	  
	  
The	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  therefore	  also	  covers	  the	  right	  to	  refrain	  from	  resorting	  to	  
court	  action	  in	  the	  event	  of	  violation	  of	  one’s	  rights,	  or	  refrain	  from	  enforcing	  one’s	  rights	  
in	  any	  other	  way.	  “If	  a	  broadcaster	  violates	  an	  individual	  right,	  the	  aggrieved	  person	  may	  
decide	  whether	  to	  enforce	  their	  individual	  rights	  against	  the	  broadcaster	  which	  committed	  
the	  violation.	  ”	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   it	   can	   thus	   be	   established	   that,	   in	  
general,	   there	   is	   a	   constitutional	   opportunity	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   dignity	   in	   the	  
media	  regulations,	  but	  in	  the	  course	  of	  these	  proceedings	  it	  can	  only	  make	  a	  finding	  of	  the	  
fact	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  fundamental	  right	  by	  ‘anonymising’	   it.	   (See	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
this	  issue	  below.)	  	  
	  
The	  material	  scope	  of	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act,	  which	  became	  effective	  on	  1	  January	  2011,	  
extends	   to	  on-­‐demand	  media	   services,	   as	  well	   as	  print	  and	  online	  press	  products	   too.	   In	  
addition	   to	   the	  material	   scope,	   the	   content	   of	   the	   relevant	   provisions	   has	   also	   changed	  
substantially.	  The	  original	  text	  of	  Article	  14	  provided	  that:	  “(1)	  The	  media	  content	  provider	  
shall,	   in	   the	   media	   content	   published	   by	   it	   and	   while	   preparing	   such	   media	   content,	  
respect	  human	  dignity.	  (2)	  No	  wanton,	  gratuitous	  and	  offensive	  presentation	  of	  persons	  in	  
humiliating,	   exposed	   or	   defenseless	   situations	   shall	   be	   allowed	   in	   the	   media	   content.”	  
Moreover,	   Article	   16	   said	   that	   “Media	   content	   providers	   shall	   respect	   the	   constitutional	  
order	  and,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  activities,	  they	  shall	  not	  violate	  human	  rights.”	  Similarly	  to	  
the	   earlier	   regulations,	   the	   text	   included	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   constitutional	   order	   and	  
human	  rights,	  but	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  was	  included	  in	  a	  separate	  statement	  of	  
facts	  and,	  within	  that,	  another	  special	  statement	  of	  facts	  provided	  for	  a	  specific	  instance	  of	  
the	   violation	   of	   human	   dignity	   (in	   the	   protection	   of	   persons	   in	   humiliating,	   exposed	   or	  
defenseless	  situations).	  
	  
It	  was	   an	   important	   change	   in	   the	   regulation	   that	   became	   effective	   in	   2011	   that	   dignity	  
violations	  committed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  production	  of	  programs	  also	  became	  prohibited.	  
(The	  courts,	   in	   the	  course	  of	   their	   review	  and	  taking	   into	  account	   the	  earlier	   regulations,	  
usually	  repealed	  the	  media	  authority	  decisions	  rendered	  in	  connection	  with	  this.)	  	  
	  
The	  Press	  Freedom	  Act	  in	  its	  original	  form	  thus	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  bring	  an	  action	  in	  cases	  
of	  the	  violation	  of	  dignity	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  production	  of	  programs.	  In	  the	  
case	   of	   such	   programs,	   where	   its	   participants	   are	   ‘deprived’	   by	   contract—with	   their	  
consent	  but	  under	  dubious	  circumstances—from	  the	  possibility	  of	   future	  enforcement	  of	  
rights	   and	   legal	   remedies,	   or	   with	   regard	   to	  whom—also	   by	   contract—the	   possibility	   of	  
preventing	   the	   recorded	   program	   from	   being	   broadcast	   (even	   if	   the	   broadcast	   is	   clearly	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injurious	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   contracting	   party,	   and	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   the	   consent	   to	  
broadcast	  would	  not	  cause	  disproportionate	  damage	  to	  the	  broadcaster)	   is	  excluded,	  the	  
media	  authority	  now	  may	  initiate	  proceedings.	  The	  authority	  did	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  this	  
regulatory	  instrument	  and,	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  law,	  as	  of	  19	  June	  2012,	  
this	  provision	  was	  deleted	  from	  the	  text	  of	  the	  statute.	  	  The	  December	  2011	  Decision	  No.	  
165/2011	   (XII.	   20)	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   found	   the	   application	   of	   human	   dignity	  
protection	   contained	   in	   the	   Press	   Freedom	  Act	   to	   press	   products	   to	   be	   unconstitutional	  
and	  remedied	  the	  constitutional	  violation	  with	  the	  pro	  futuro	  repeal	  of	  the	  material	  scope	  
of	  the	  statute.	  
	  
The	  Constitutional	  Court	  continues	  to	  consider	  the	  general	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  in	  
connection	  with	  media	   services	   to	   be	   constitutional.	   The	   principal	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   the	  
media	   effect	   theory,	   which	   appeared	   several	   times	   before	   in	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	  
Constitutional	  Court.	  In	  the	  decision	  the	  tribunal	  confirmed	  its	  previous	  position	  according	  
to	  which	  	  
	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   audiovisual	   media,	   which	   have	   a	   special	   influence	   on	   the	  
thinking	  of	  people	  and	  social	  processes,	  to	  guarantee	  such	  special	  action	  by	  
the	   authority	   is	   a	   necessary	   and	   proportionate	   restriction.	   .	   .	   .	   This	  
administrative	  proceeding,	  which	   is	   guaranteed	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   the	  viewers	  
and	   listeners,	   is	   considered	   a	   necessary	   and	   proportionate	   intervention	  
because	  of	  their	  especially	  strong	  influence	  on	  the	  audience.	  However,	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   print	   and	   on-­‐line	   media,	   the	   influence	   of	   which	   is	   different,	   the	  
option	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   action—in	   this	   form	   generally	   extending	   to	   human	  
rights—is	   considered	   a	   disproportionate	   restriction.	   (Statement	   of	   reasons,	  
paragraph	  IV.	  2.2.2.)	  	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  media	  effect	  theory	  is	  disputed	  by	  many,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  indeed	  
argued	   that,	   in	   today’s	   convergent	  media	   world,	   television	   and	   radio’s	   sharp	   distinction	  
from	   the	   press	   cannot	   be	   justified	   in	   the	   regulation.	   However,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   media	  
consumption	   statistics,	   these	   two	   types	   of	   services	   are	   the	   most	   influential	   today.	   The	  
Press	   Freedom	   Act	   is	   based	   on	   the	   concept	   that	   certain	   content	   requirements	   can	   be	  
prescribed	   to	   all	   media	   outlets,	   and	   in	   its	   opinion	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   finds	   this	  
approach	  constitutional	  with	  respect	  to	  hate	  speech,	  the	  protection	  of	  constitutional	  order	  
and	   minors,	   as	   well	   as	   advertising	   rules.	   While	   the	   tribunal	   accepted	   the	   argument,	  
according	   to	   which	  media	   regulation	   protects	   the	   public	   interest	   and	   not	   the	   individual	  
rights	  of	  the	  aggrieved	  person,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  press,	  it	  finds	  the	  media	  effect	  theory,	  
as	   well	   as	   the	   availability	   of	   civil	   and	   criminal	   proceedings	   protecting	   individual	   rights	  
sufficient	  to	  declare	  constitutional	  violation.	  This	  is	  without	  a	  doubt	  a	  coherent	  argument;	  
however,	  the	  determination	  of	  its	  validity	  depends	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  media	  effect	  
theory	   (without	   precise	   data,	   the	   application	   of	   the	   effect	   theory	   is	   primarily	   the	  
acceptance	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court).	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In	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  decision,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  states	  that	  “it	  is	  justified	  that	  the	  
authority—within	   the	   scope	   concerning	   the	   institutional	   content	  of	   these	   rights—	   .	   .	   .	   in	  
the	   interest	   of	   the	   community,	   has	   the	   means	   to	   take	   action	   against	   the	   offender.”	  
(Paragraph	   IV.	  2.	  2.	  2.)	  From	  this,	   compared	  with	   the	  2007	  Constitutional	  Court	  decision,	  
the	   need	   for	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   branches	   of	   law	   safeguarding	   individual	   rights	   and	  
media	  regulation	  is	  more	  clearly	  distinguishable.	  
	  
The	  decision	  also	  provides	  that	  human	  dignity	  may	  be	  protected	  with	  respect	  to	  any	  media	  
content,	  thus,	  given	  certain	  conditions,	  it	  can	  be	  the	  limitation	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  
with	  respect	  to	  press	  products,	  too,	  if	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  regulation	  not	  in	  a	  general	  wording	  
but	  as	  a	  concrete	  statement	  of	   facts.	   It	   follows	  from	  this	   that	  the	  provision	  under	  Article	  
14(2)	   of	   the	   Press	   Freedom	   Act	   on	   persons	   in	   humiliating,	   exposed	   or	   defenseless	  
situations	   is	   constitutional	   with	   respect	   to	   press	   products	   too.	   According	   to	   the	  
Constitutional	  Court’s	  reasoning:	  	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  Article	  14(2)	  of	   the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act	  sets	   forth	  such	  a	  special	  
cause	   of	   statement	   of	   facts,	   which	   enables	   media	   authority	   actions	  
sufficiently	   narrow	   in	   scope	   and	   based	   on	   a	   particularly	   compelling	   public	  
interest.	   The	   provision	   regulating	   treatment	   of	   persons	   in	   humiliating,	  
exposed	  or	  defenseless	   situations—in	  addition	   to	   indicating	   the	  absence	  or	  
limitation	  of	   their	  qualification	   for	  personal	   rights	  protection—covers	   those	  
instances	  of	  human	   rights	   violations	  which	   could	   seriously	   compromise	   the	  
prevalence	   of	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   institution	   of	   human	   dignity.	   Legal	  
protection	  by	  the	  authority	  within	  this	  realm	  therefore	  means	  proportionate	  
restriction	  in	  the	  case	  of	  all	  media	  channels.	  (Reasoning,	  paragraph	  IV.	  2.2.2.)	  	  
	  
The	  tribunal	  made	   it	  clear	   that	   this	  case—in	  addition	  to	  the	   limited	  status	  of	   the	  right	   to	  
self-­‐determination—justifies	   action	   because	   it	   may	   also	   seriously	   compromise	   “the	  
substance	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  human	  dignity”—thus,	  according	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  
the	   objective	   and	   justification	   of	   the	   regulation	   is	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   institution	   of	  
human	   dignity—more	   precisely,	   the	   protection	   of	   its	   “institutional	   substance”—and	   not	  
the	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights.	  It	  can	  be	  concluded	  from	  this	  part	  of	  the	  reasoning	  that	  
the	   Constitutional	   Court	   would	   accept	   as	   constitutional	   other	   specific	   fact	   patterns	  
undeniably	  violating	  human	  dignity	  if	  they	  were	  sufficiently	  narrow	  in	  scope	  and	  based	  on	  
a	  particularly	  compelling	  public	  interest,	  and	  the	  circumstances	  pertain	  to	  a	  case	  where	  the	  
qualification	  for	  personal	  rights	  protection	  is	  absent	  or	  limited.	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  legislature,	  which	  was	  in	  a	  legislative	  dilemma,	  chose	  the	  simplest	  solution:	  
according	   to	   the	   text	  effective	  as	  of	   June	  19,	  2012	  of	  Article	  14(1)	  of	   the	  Press	  Freedom	  
Act,	   “[m]edia	   service	   providers,	   in	   media	   content	   they	   publish,	   shall	   respect	   human	  
dignity.”	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   text	   applies	   only	   to	   (linear	   and	  on-­‐demand)	  media	   services	  
and	  only	  to	  the	  content	  that	  appears	  on	  the	  screen	  or	  is	  audible	  in	  the	  ether.	  Furthermore,	  
the	   legislature	  has	  deleted	  the	  protection	  of	  “human	  rights”	   from	  Article	  16,	   thus	  closing	  
2013]	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an	  old,	  unresolved	  dispute	  (originating	  from	  the	  interpretation	  problems	  of	  the	  text	  of	  the	  
1996	   Media	   Act)	   that	   surrounded	   the	   question	   as	   to	   which	   human	   rights	   should	   be	  
protected	  by	  the	  media	  regulations.	  Pursuant	  to	  the	  new	  wording,	  this	  can	  only	  be	  a	  right	  
specified	  in	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act	  (such	  as	  human	  dignity).	  	  
	  
	  
D.	  Justification	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  under	  the	  media	  regulations	  
	  
I.	  Institutional	  Protection—An	  Individual	  Right	  
	  
We	  have	   to	   take	   a	   short	   detour	   to	   the	   foundations	  of	   the	   “state	   institutional	   protection	  
obligation”	  developed	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  According	  to	  the	  principles	  laid	  down	  in	  
Decision	  No.	  64/1991.	  (XII.	  17.)	  AB	  of	  the	  CC,	  the	  human	  rights	  protection	  obligation	  of	  the	  
state	   has	   a	   dual	   nature:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   protects	   the	   human	   rights	   guaranteed	   to	  
individuals	   (legal	   entities),	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   certain	   cases—and	  with	   respect	   to	  
certain	  human	  rights—it	  has	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  the	  prevalence	  of	  
human	   rights	   (institutional	   protection).	   The	   institutional	   protection	   of	   a	   certain	   human	  
right	  may	  be	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  restriction	  of	  another.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  
opinion,	   for	   example,	   based	  on	  Decision	  No.	   30/1992.	   (V.	   26.)	  AB	  of	   the	  CC,	   the	   state	   is	  
required	  not	  only	  to	  guarantee	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  expression	  of	  opinion	  to	  its	  citizens	  but	  
it	  also	  has	  to	  ensure	  the	  appropriate	  functioning	  of	  democratic	  public	  opinion.	  Decision	  No.	  
46/2007.	   (VI.	   27.)	   AB	   and	  Decision	  No.	   165/2011.	   (XII.	   20.)	   AB	   of	   the	   CC—especially	   the	  
latter—opened	  the	  gate	  toward	  such	  an	  interpretation,	  based	  on	  which	  the	  protection	  of	  
human	   rights	   and	   human	   dignity	   under	   the	   media	   regulations	   also	   stems	   from	   the	  
institutional	  protection	  obligation	  of	  the	  state.	  
	  
The	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  is	  one	  of	  the	  negative	  obligations	  (i.e.	  it	  obliges	  restraint,	  
in	   other	   words,	   avoidance	   of	   infringements),	   which—similarly	   to	   certain	   positive	  
obligations—through	  the	  institutional	  protection	  of	  these	  rights,	  protects	  the	  appropriate	  
functioning	   of	   a	   democratic	   public	   sphere	   and	   not	   the	   individuals	   potentially	   violated	   in	  
their	   rights.	   Because	   the	   main	   justification	   of	   rules	   appearing	   as	   restrictions	   on	   the	  
freedom	   of	   the	   press	   is	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   viewer/listener/reader	   (collectively:	   the	  
audience),	   “entitled”	   to	   such	   protection	   as	   a	   member	   of	   society	   and	   those	   common	  
interests	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  general	  recognition	  and	  respect	  of	  human	  rights.	  When	  
media	   regulations	   prohibit	   the	   violation	   of	   human	   dignity,	   it	   protects	   with	   this	  
fundamental	   principle	   of	   European	   civilization,	   that	   is,	   it	   excludes	   from	   democratic	  
publicity	  that	  content	  which	  channels	  the	   lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  respect,	  appreciation	  
and	  equal	  status	  to	  which	  the	  individual	  is	  entitled.	  	  
	  
Human	  dignity	  is	  a	  fundamental	  value,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  which	  permeates	  the	  entirety	  of	  
the	  legal	  system	  and	  every	  venue	  of	  public	  life	  and	  so	  the	  media	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  
than	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   personality	   of	   people	   violated	   in	   their	   rights,	   because	   the	  
respect	  of	  this	  basic	  value	  is	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  foundations	  of	  public	  life	  and	  cooperation.	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(According	   to	   the	   Constitutional	   Court’s	   view,	   the	   television	   and	   radio	   programs	   can	  
seriously	  compromise	  this	  foundation,	  while	  press	  products	  cannot.)	  
	  
The	  individual	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  in	  the	  media	  regulations	  is	  also	  justified	  by	  the	  
special	  functions	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  media.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  media	  not	  only	  ”turn	  
up	   the	   volume”	  of	   specific	   opinions	   and	   communications	   (and	  by	   this,	   offensive	   content	  
become	   “more	   dangerous”),	   but	   also—to	   a	   degree	   hard	   to	   measure—influence	   the	  
audience;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  shape	  the	  level	  of	  demand,	  taste	  and	  culture	  of	  society.	  The	  
role	  of	  the	  media	  is	  also	  symbolic:	  the	  media	  as	  a	  system	  symbolize	  the	  democratic	  system	  
and,	  as	  the	  most	  important	  domain	  for	  social	  publicity,	  provide	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  functioning	  
of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  such,	  the	  limitations	  set	  for	  the	  media	  are	  in	  part	  also	  symbolic:	  
they	   provide	   a	   picture	   of	   which	   values	   the	   legislature	   finds	   desirable	   to	   protect,	   even	  
against	  those	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  no	  restrictions	  on	  public	  debate.	  
	  
The	   Constitutional	   Court’s	   jurisprudence	   drives	   enforcement	   toward	   this	   interpretation.	  
According	  to	  Decision	  No.	  46/2007	  (VI.	  27)	  AB,	  	  
	  
[t]he	   NRTC	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   administrative	   proceedings	   is	   entitled	   to	  
establish	  whether	   the	  broadcaster	   carries	  out	   its	   activities	  while	   respecting	  
human	  rights,	  and	  whether	  the	  subject-­‐matter,	  nature	  and	  perspective	  of	  its	  
individual	  programs	  violate	  fundamental	  values	  embodied	  in	  human	  rights.	  
	  
It	   follows	   from	   this	   that,	   even	   if	   according	   to	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   the	   violation	   of	  
human	  rights	  can	  be	  established	  based	  not	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  individual	  rights	  but	  on	  
the	  “nature	  and	  perspective”	  of	  the	  program,	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  more	  than	  mere	  individual	  
grievance,	  but	  the	  behavior	  “required”	  to	  establish	  the	  violation,	  which	  is	  more	  serious	  by	  
comparison.	  
	  
The	   reasoning	   of	   Decision	   No.	   165/2011	   (XII.	   20)	   AB	   of	   the	   CC	   provides	   more	  
straightforward	  reference	  points	  for	  an	  interpretation	  arguing	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  
institutional	  protection	  and	  protection	  of	   individual	   rights.	   The	   reasoning	  of	   the	  decision	  
cited	   before	   finds	   that	   the	   authority	   does	   not	   act	   “in	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   side	   of	   the	  
protected	   right	   relating	   to	   the	   individual,”	   and	   then	   state	   that	   the	  media	   “is	   capable	   of	  
bringing	   about	   destruction	   in	   the	   culture	   of	   respect	   for	   human	   rights,	   especially	   human	  
dignity;”	   hence,	   the	   protection	   of	   culture	  may	   be	   the	   objective	   of	   the	  media	   regulation.	  
After	   this,	   the	   reasoning	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	  “it	   is	   justified	   that	   the	  authority—within	   the	  
scope	  touching	   the	   institutional	  content	  of	   these	  rights—	  …	  has	   the	  ability	   to	  act	  against	  
the	  violator.”	  With	  respect	  to	  Article	  14(2)	  of	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act,	   it	  provides	  that	  the	  
special	   protection	   of	   persons	   in	   humiliating,	   exposed	   or	   defenseless	   situations	   is	  
appropriate	  because	  it	  may	  seriously	  compromise	  “the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  
institution	  of	  human	  dignity.”	  (All	  quotes	  are	  from	  paragraph	  IV.	  2.2.2.	  of	  the	  reasoning	  of	  
the	  opinion.)	  From	  the	  quoted	  sections	  of	  the	  text,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that,	  according	  to	  the	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Constitutional	  Court,	  the	  objective	  and	  justification	  of	  the	  regulation	  are	  the	  protection	  of	  
the	  ‘institutional	  content’	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  community	  (and	  not	  the	  individual).	  
	  
There	   is	  only	  one	   final	  order	   in	  appellate	  proceedings	  which	  considered	   this	   issue	  with	  a	  
ruling	   that	   overturned	   the	   decision	   of	   the	  media	   authority.	   In	   a	   tabloid	  program	   from	   a	  
commercial	   television	   station,	   a	  patient	   treated	   in	   a	  psychiatric	  ward	  was	   recorded	  on	  a	  
hidden	  camera	  in	  a	  humiliating	  situation	  while	  he	  was	  tied	  to	  the	  bed.	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  
authority	  [Decision	  No.	  1825/2008	  (X.	  1)	  ORTT	  of	  the	  NRTC]	  sanctioned	  the	  media	  service	  
provider	   for	   the	   violation	   of	   the	   patient’s	   personality	   rights	   (right	   to	   one’s	   likeness	   and	  
right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   and	   through	   these,	   the	   violation	   of	   the	   patient’s	   human	  
dignity).	  Although	  the	  institutional	  content	  might	  also	  have	  been	  violated	  by	  the	  depiction	  
of	   the	   person	   in	   a	   humiliating,	   exposed	   or	   defenseless	   situation,	   the	   decision	   clearly	  
referred	   to	   the	   violation	   of	   individual	   rights.	   However,	   the	   Hungarian	   Supreme	   Court,	  
which	   ultimately	   decided	   the	   case,	   stated	   in	   its	   opinion	   (Decision	   No.	   Kfv.	  
III.37.554./2010/5)	  that	  	  
	  
[the	  authority]	  may	  examine	  the	  violation	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  context	  as	  
to	   whether	   the	   subject,	   nature	   and	   perspective	   of	   the	   program	   at	   issue	  
violate	   the	   fundamental	   values	  materializing	   in	  human	   rights.	  Although	   the	  
right	   to	   the	   freedom	   of	   self-­‐determination	   is	   part	   of	   the	   right	   to	   human	  
dignity,	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   the	   right	   to	   one’s	   likeness	   or	   other	   personal	  
rights	  of	  the	  person	  in	  the	  program	  was	  violated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  person	  
did	  not	  consent	  to	  the	  broadcasting	  is	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  domain	  of	  civil	  law.	  As	  
it	   is	  apparent	  from	  Article	  75(3)	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  personality	  rights	  may	  be	  
also	   violated	   even	   if	   the	   concerned	   person	   has	   consented	   if	   it	   violates	   or	  
compromises	   social	   values.	  When	   the	   defendant	   authority	   has	   the	   right	   to	  
act	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   an	   interest	  protected	  by	   the	  Radio	   and	  Television	  
Broadcasting	   Act	   or	   for	   enforcing	   respect	   for	   the	   constitutional	   order—
manifested	  primarily	  in	  fundamental	  human	  rights—the	  inquiry	  should	  focus	  
on	   whether	   the	   public	   interest	   protected	   by	   the	   Radio	   and	   Television	  
Broadcasting	  Act	  is	  violated	  or	  compromised,	  independent	  of	  the	  concerned	  
person’s	   consent.	   If	   this	   protected	   value	   is	   not	   violated	   but	   the	   personal	  
rights	   and	  human	  dignity	   of	   the	   concerned	  person	   are	   violated	  by	   the	   fact	  
that	   the	   program	   at	   issue	   was	   broadcasted	   without	   the	   consent	   of	   this	  
person,	  then	  such	  a	  situation,	   in	  which	  legal	  violation	  occurred	  not	  because	  
of	  the	  broadcasting	  of	  the	  program	  toward	  the	  audience	  but	  based	  on	  facts	  
outside	  of	  the	  subject,	  nature	  and	  perspective	  of	  the	  program—of	  which	  the	  
audience	   watching	   the	   program	   usually	   does	   not	   even	   know—a	   personal	  
rights	   violation,	   violating	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination,	   may	   also	   be	  
enforced	   before	   a	   civil	   court	   as	   a	   right	   belonging	   to	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐
determination	   of	   the	   aggrieved	   person.	   It	   follows	   from	   this	   that	   the	   legal	  
violation	   in	   itself	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   basis	   for	   media	   authority	   action—
pursuant	   to	   Article	   3(2)	   of	   the	   Radio	   and	   Television	   Broadcasting	   Act	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referring	   to	   Article	   54(1)	   of	   the	   Constitution	   -­‐,	   although	   this	   circumstance	  
may	   be	   considered	   in	   the	   course	   of	   imposing	   sanctions	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
violation	  of	   an	   interest	  protected	  by	   the	  Radio	  and	  Television	  Broadcasting	  
Act.	  
	  
With	  this	  opinion,	  the	  Hungarian	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  defined	  for	  enforcement	  purposes	  the	  
appropriate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  under	  the	  media	  regulations.	  	  
The	  negative	  obligations	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act—therefore	  also	   including	  the	  
protection	  of	  human	  dignity—establish	  through	  the	  media	  such	  basic	  “rules	  of	  the	  game,”	  
the	   respect	  of	  which	   is	   a	  precondition	   for	   conducting	   the	  debate.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  
community	   has	   an	   interest	   in	   knowing	   all	   positions,	   hence	   even	   strong,	   sometimes	  
outrageous,	  offensive	  or	  disturbing	  opinions;	  the	  community	  may	  not	  be	  deprived	  of	  their	  
communication—merely	   by	   referring	   to	   their	   previously	   mentioned	   nature—in	   other	  
words,	   the	   freedom	   of	   the	   press	   and	   open	   public	   debate	   can	   only	   be	   restricted	   with	  
reference	   to	   human	   dignity	   violations	   based	   on	   sufficiently	   serious	   grounds,	  
proportionately	  and	  within	  an	  appropriately	  narrow	  scope.	  
	  
	  
II.	  Right	  to	  Self-­‐Determination—Separation	  of	  the	  Branches	  of	  the	  Law	  
	  
The	  media	  regulations	  may	  not	  restrict	  the	  individual's	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  and	  the	  
media	  authority	  may	  not	  act	   in	  the	  defense	  of	  others’—individual—rights,	   irrespective	  of	  
the	  fact	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  person	  concerned	  has	  turned	  to	  other	  available	  forums	  
before.	   Regarding	   the	   adjudication	   of	   cases	   which	   were	   initiated	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
circumstances	  that	  also	  qualify	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  individual	  rights,	  the	  media	  regulations	  also	  
take	   into	  account	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	   initiation	  of	  other	   (criminal	  or	  civil	   court)	  actions,	  
and	   the	   tribunals	   administering	   the	   law	   (the	   media	   authority	   and	   the	   courts)	   must	  
distinguish	  the	  media	  regulations	  from	  these	  other	  procedures.	  	  
	  
The	  primary	  objective	  of	  criminal	  law	  is	  to	  deter	  its	  citizens	  from	  committing	  crimes	  in	  the	  
future	  using	  the	  instruments	  of	  the	  state’s	  penal	  authority,	  while	  the	  objective	  of	  civil	  law	  
is	  to	  provide,	  if	  a	  right	  has	  been	  violated,	  the	  injured	  party	  with	  appropriate	  remedies	  (for	  
example,	   by	   compensation	   for	   damages);	   this	   justifies,	   for	   example,	   conducting	  
simultaneous	  proceedings	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  person.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  no	  similarly	  
strong	  arguments	  can	  be	  raised	  for	  creating	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  third	  proceedings	  (that	  of	  
the	   media	   authority)	   to	   protect	   the	   individual.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   media	   regulation	  
primarily	   protects—through	   the	   institutional	   protection	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   human	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The	  media	  authority	  has	  a	   serious	   jurisprudence	   in	   the	   institutional	  protection	  of	  human	  
dignity.	   According	   to	   our	   position,	   cases	   in	   which	   certain	   media	   service	   providers	   show	  
victims	  who	  are	  exposed	  or	  defenseless,	  or	  in	  a	  helpless	  situation	  or	  victims	  of	  accidents	  or	  
crimes	   [e.g.	   Decision	   No.	   2637/2006	   (XI.	   29.)	   ORTT	   of	   the	   NRTC,	   in	  which	   case	   a	  media	  
service	  provider	  showed	  victims	  seriously	  injured	  during	  the	  20	  August	  fireworks]	  may	  be	  
regarded	  as	  acting	  for	  the	  institutional	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity;	  this	  statement	  of	  facts	  
is	  set	  forth	  with	  special	  emphasis	  in	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act.	  	  
	  
Institutional	  protection	  may	  be	  similarly	   invoked	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
appropriate	   level	   of	   physical	   and	   emotional	   development	   of	   minors.	   The	   protection	   of	  
minors	  and	   the	  undisturbed	   fulfillment	  of	   their	  personality	  are	  common	  social	  objectives	  
and	  interests,	  and,	  therefore,	   it	  may	  be	  justified	   in	  certain	  cases	  to	   invoke	  public	   interest	  
legal	  enforcement	  in	  their	  cases;	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  institutional	  protection	  of	  dignity	  may	  
be	  necessary.	  The	  instance	  of	  a	  program	  showing	  the	  humiliation	  of	  a	  boy	  by	  his	  peers	  in	  
the	  news	  from	  a	  media	  service	  provider	  [Decision	  No.	  952/2009	  (IV.	  29)	  ORTT	  of	  the	  NRTC]	  
or	   the	   interview	   made	   with	   a	   child	   who	   murdered	   her	   foster	   parent	   [Decision	   No.	  
736/2003	  (V.	  29)	  ORTT	  of	  the	  NRTC]	  could	  serve	  as	  relevant	  examples.	  In	  these	  situations	  
we	  find	  authority	  action	  justified;	  not	  because	  it	  “substitutes”	  the	  theoretically	  existing	  but	  
in	  practice	   limited	   individual	   legal	   remedy,	  but	  because	   in	   these	  actual	   situations	  we	  can	  
discover	   institutional	   content	   violations.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   offences	   in	   these	   actual	  
situations	  disregard	  and	  violate	  fundamental	  social	  norms	  and	  interests—the	  solidarity	  of	  
the	  community	  and	  the	  healthy	  development	  of	  minors.	  
	  
Programs	  with	  a	  concept	  and	  nature	  which	  disregard	  the	  respect	  of	  dignity	  and	  are	  built	  on	  
questioning	   the	   fundamental	   value	   of	   dignity	   and	   the	   ”untouchability”	   of	   human	  
personality	  are	  also	  capable	  of	  violating	  human	  dignity.	  In	  2001,	  in	  the	  trailer	  for	  a	  program	  
called	  “The	  Reporter	  Tamás	  Frei,”	  aired	  on	  a	  commercial	  television	  channel,	  the	  following	  
pitch	  was	  announced:	  “Be	  part	  of	  a	  risky	  adventure.	  Accompany	  Tamás	  Frei	  [the	  reporter]	  
to	  Moscow!	  Hire	   the	  hit-­‐man	  who,	   for	  one	  million	  dollars,	  would	  even	  kill	   the	  Hungarian	  
prime	  minister,	  with	  him!”	  Decision	  No.	  665/2001	  (V.	  16)	  ORTT	  of	  the	  NRTC	  found	  for	  the	  
violation	   of	   human	   dignity,	   not	   because	   the	   personal	   rights	   of	   the	   prime	  minister	   were	  
violated,	  but	  because	  the	  message	  of	  the	  program	  was	  “capable	  of	  generating	  a	  sense	  of	  
fear	  by	  suggesting	  that	  a	  person	  who	  can	  be	  hired	  for	  money,	  crossing	  all	  obstacles,	  merely	  
in	   the	   hope	   of	   financial	   gains,	   would	   commit	   a	   violent	   act	   resulting	   in	   the	   taking	   of	   a	  
human	  life.	  The	  statement	  of	  the	  communication,	  evoking	  intense	  emotions	  in	  the	  viewers,	  
uttered	  in	  the	  imperative	  in	  a	  form	  that	  violated	  human	  dignity,	  is	  unacceptable.”	  	  
	  
The	  proceedings	   initiated	   in	  connection	  with	  the	  program	  called	  “The	  Price	  of	   the	  Truth”	  
are	  an	   important	  milestone	   in	   the	  enforcement	  practice	  of	   the	  media	  authority,	  because	  
they	   introduced	   a	   new	   rule	   of	   interpretation.	   The	  NRTC	   found	   for	   violation	   in	   that	   case,	  
because	  the	  program	  suggested	  that	  human	  personality	  does	  not	  have	  untouchable	  realms	  
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  14	  No.	  07 836	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
and	   	   human	   dignity	   may	   be	   made	   public	   and	   accessible	   to	   anybody	   for	   financial	   gain	  
[Decision	  No.	  748/2008	  (IV.	  29)	  ORTT	  of	  the	  NRTC].	  
	  
The	  new	  media	  authority,	  the	  Media	  Council	   (established	  in	  2010	  by	  the	  new	  regulation),	  
followed	  the	  tracks	  of	  “The	  Price	  of	  the	  Truth”	  case.	  The	  tribunal	  found	  that	  a	  reality	  show	  
(“Alekosz	   Is	   Looking	   for	   a	   Wife”)	   violated	   human	   dignity	   and,	   with	   its	   2011	   decision,	  
sanctioned	   the	   given	   large	   commercial	   media	   service	   provider	   for	   “objectifying”	   the	  
participants,	  humiliating	  them	  in	  their	  femininity,	  deceiving	  them	  and	  making	  their	  private	  
sphere	  public,	  as	  well	  as	  suggesting	  that	  human	  personality	  has	  no	  untouchable	  realms	  and	  
that	  one	  can	  surrender	  the	   inviolability	  of	  human	  dignity	   for	   financial	  gains	  [Decision	  No.	  
1044/2011	  (VII.	  19)].	  According	  to	  the	  authority,	  neither	  the	  participants’	  consent	  nor	  the	  
extent	   of	   limitation	   of	   the	   utilization	   of	   legal	   means	   related	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   their	  
personality	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  consent	  changes	  the	  fact	  of	  violation.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  media	  content	  that	  questions	  the	  equality,	  unrestrictability	  and	  irrevocability	  
of	  human	  dignity,	  which	  prevails	  with	  respect	  to	  every	  individual	  and	  social	  group,	  may	  be	  
also	  regarded	  as	  the	  violation	  of	  human	  dignity.	  Based	  on	  the	  2011	  decisions	  of	  the	  Media	  
Council,	   offensive	   opinions	   articulated	   against	   the	   Roma	   minority	   which	   disregard	   the	  
value	   of	   human	   dignity,	   to	   which	   everybody	   is	   equally	   entitled,	   shall	   be	   considered	  
unlawful	  [Decision	  No.	  828/2011	  (VI.	  22)	  and	  Decision	  No.	  1153/2011	  (IX.	  1)].	  	  Based	  on	  the	  
jurisprudence,	  specific	  media	  content	  which	  violates	  human	  dignity	  may	  in	  part	  be	  typified.	  
The	   following	   instances	   may	   be	   regarded	   as	   such:	  
	  
− Explicit,	   recognizable	   and	   offensive	   depiction	   of	   persons	   in	   exposed	   or	  
defenseless,	   helpless,	   or	   humiliating	   situations—e.g.	   victims	   of	   accidents	   or	  
crimes—(in	   their	   cases	   the	   enforcement	   of	   rights	   is	   inherently	   limited,	   and	  
showing	  people	  in	  these	  situations	  violates	  the	  rules	  of	  social	  coexistence	  too);	  
− The	   showing	   of	   minors	   in	   activities	   which	   violate	   human	   dignity	   or	   which	  
necessitate	   institutional	  protection;	   individual	  enforcement	  of	   rights	   is	   limited	   in	  
their	  cases	   too	  and	  the	  appropriate	  development	  of	   the	  personality	  of	  minors	   is	  
also	   a	   common	   social	   interest,	   and	   action	   against	   content	   threatening	   that	   is	  
justifiable	   (it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   Article	   19(4a)	   of	   the	   Press	   Freedom	   Act,	  
effective	   as	   of	   19	   June	   2012,	   supplements	   this	   situation	   and	   formulates	   the	  
prohibition	  of	  showing	  minor	  persons	  in	  an	  offensive	  manner	  directly	  in	  the	  media	  
content;	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   amendment	   was	   quite	   clearly	   to	   provide	   media	   law	  
sanctions	   for	   such	   content	   appearing	   in	   press	   products	   too,	   despite	   the	  
amendments	  that	  became	  necessary	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Decision	  No.	  165/2011	  (XII.	  20)	  
AB);	  
− Treatment	   of	   certain	   persons	   or	   social	   groups	   as	   second	   class	   compared	   with	  
others,	  as	  well	  as	  questioning	  their	  equal	  human	  dignity	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  their	  
personal	  rights	  (the	  distinction	  between	  these	  cases	  and	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  
circumstances	   contained	   in	   Article	   17(2)	   of	   the	   Press	   Freedom	   Act—the	  
prohibition	  of	  exclusion—can	  be	  a	  difficult	  task	  for	  the	  courts	  or	  the	  authority);	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− When	   the	   content	  of	  a	  media	   service	   suggests	   that	  human	  personality	  does	  not	  
have	  untouchable	  realms,	  human	  life	  can	  be	  taken	  for	  money	  and	  human	  dignity	  
for	  financial	  gain	  may	  be	  made	  public	  and	  accessible	  to	  anybody.	  	  
	  
	  
F.	  “The	  Price	  of	  the	  Truth”	  case	  
	  
Decision	   No.	   748/2008	   (IV.	   29)	   ORTT	   of	   the	   NRTC	   received	   broader—professional—
publicity,	   considering	   that	   it	   introduced	   a	   new	   type	   of	   interpretation	   in	   the	   authority’s	  
analysis	  of	  human	  dignity	  (human	  rights),13	  so	  it	  is	  worth	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  case.	  	  
	  
“The	  Price	  of	   the	  Truth”	  was	  a	  game	  show	  and,	  before	   the	   studio	   recording,	   the	  players	  
participated	   in	   a	   polygraph	   lie	   detector	   test,	   responding	   to	   certain	   different	   (in	   part	  
innocent,	   in	   part	   embarrassingly	   personal)	   questions.	  When	   later,	   during	   the	   recording,	  
they	   were	   asked	   some	   of	   the	   same	   questions,	   it	   was	   revealed	   immediately	   after	   they	  
responded	  whether	  the	  earlier	  lie	  detector	  test	  had	  accepted	  their	  answer	  as	  true	  or	  false.	  	  
	  
The	  authority’s	  investigation	  of	  the	  5	  March	  2008	  episode	  found,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  
following:	  
	  
[T]he	   first	   round	   of	   questions	   is	   less	   uncomfortable	   for	   the	   players;	   in	   this	  
case	  they	  related	  to	  the	  lady’s	  appearance	  or	  perhaps	  hypothetical	  situations	  
(“Can	   you	   look	   into	   the	   mirror	   in	   the	   morning	   without	   make-­‐up?	   Do	   you	  
prefer	   if	  your	   intellect	   is	  complemented	  and	  not	  your	  cleavage?	  Would	  you	  
be	   willing	   to	   engage	   in	   cannibalism	   in	   order	   to	   stay	   alive?”)	   The	   above	  
questions—according	   to	   our	   opinion—contributed	   to	   revealing	   the	   side	   of	  
the	  player’s	  personality,	  which	  after	  commercial	  break	  could	  be	  followed	  by	  
a	   group	   of	   questions—becoming	   more	   and	   more	   embarrassing	   as	   the	  
amount	   of	   the	   prize	   increased—organized	   primarily	   around	   the	   subject	   of	  
sexuality.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   footage	   closing	   the	   segment	   already	  
projected	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   player,	   and	   the	   viewers	   could	   witness	   the	  
player’s	  breakdown.	  They	  could	  see	  as	  the	  sobbing	  player’s	  girlfriends	  escort	  
her	   out	   (22:20:24),	   and	   they	   could	   also	   hear	   one	   of	   them	   telling	   the	  
cameraman	  “Stop	  recording	  this!”(22:20:28).	  
	  	  In	   the	  second	  segment	  of	   the	  program,	   the	  player	  had	  to	  answer—among	  
others—the	  following	  questions:	  
                                            
13	   	   László	  Majtényi,	  Az	  ORTT	   szabadságjog-­‐védelmi	   szerepe,	   (The	  NRTC’s	   Role	   in	   Protecting	   Freedom	  Rights),	   2	  
FUNDAMENTUM	  102	  (2010);	  Gábor	  Polyák,	  A	  Legfelsőbb	  Bíróság	  ítélete	  Az	  igazság	  ára	  című	  televíziós	  műsorszámról	  
(The	   judgement	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   regarding	   the	   television	   program	   entitled	   the	   “Price	   of	   the	   Truth”),	   2	  
JOGESETEK	  MAGYARÁZATA	  35	  (2011).	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–	  (22:30:01)	  “Have	  you	  ever	  been	  disgusted	  by	  yourself?	  The	  answer:	  ‘yes’.”	  
–	  (22:31:56)	  “Do	  you	  have	  a	  breast	  implant?	  The	  answer:	  ‘yes’.”	  
–	  (22:34:38)	  “Do	  you	  also	  sleep	  with	  the	  musicians?	  The	  answer:	  ‘yes’.”	  
–	   (22:35:31)	   “Have	   you	   had	   sex	  with	  more	   than	   one	  man	   simultaneously?	  
The	  answer:	  ‘yes’.”	  
After	   the	   player	   reached	   the	   one	   million-­‐forint	   limit,	   the	   host	   asked	   the	  
player	   the	  question:	   “Do	  you	  want	  more	  money?”	  The	  player	   said	  yes.	  The	  
host,	   noticing	   the	   player	   became	   uncertain,	   thought	   he	   should	   stress	   the	  
rules	  of	  the	  game	  in	  front	  of	  the	  cameras,	  too.	  
(22:37:26)	  
Player:	  “I	  don’t	  think	  that	  there	  are	  more	  embarrassing	  questions	  than	  this.	  
Although	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  embarrass	  me.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  questions	  I’m	  afraid	  of.”	  
Host:	  “The	  question	  is	  whether	  you	  lied	  during	  the	  test.”	  
P:	  “No,	  but	  these	  are	  emotional	  questions	  and	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  yes	  or	  
no	  questions,	  and	  in	  addition	  not	  all.”	  
H:	  “But	  there	  is	  a	  result	  that	  is	  objective.”	  
P:	  “Sure.”	  
H:	  “So,	  you	  cannot.”	  
The	  host	  motions	  with	  his	  hand	  that	  it	  is	  not	  questionable.	  
P:	   “Sure,	   of	   course.	   It	   is	   just	   hard,	   it	   is	   just	   hard	   to	   answer	   them,	   not	   to	  
evaluate	  them,	  obviously.	  For	  me	  to	  decide,	  so	  that	  .	  .	  .	  ”	  
H:	  “This	  is	  why	  you	  can	  win	  so	  much	  money.	  You	  know	  that	  you	  can	  lose	  this	  
one	  million	  forints	  if	  you	  gave	  a	  false	  answer	  even	  once?”	  
P:	  “Yes.”	  
Question	  16	   concerned	   the	   sexual	   habits	   of	   the	  player	   again,	   but	   this	   time	  
the	  host	  wanted	  to	  learn	  more.	  
(22:39:26)	  
H:	  “Have	  you	  ever	  been	  tied	  up	  during	  sex?	  The	  answer:	  yes.”	  
P:	   “Don’t	   look	   at	  me	   like	   this!	  What	   do	   you	  want	   to	   know?	   I	   do	   not	  want	  
technical	  details.”	  
H:	  “In	  short,	  everything	  .”	  
P:	  “I	  thought	  so.	  But	  if	  I’m	  correct,	  this	  is	  a	  PG	  rated	  programme.	  I	  wouldn’t	  
get	  into	  it,	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  to	  say.	  I	  am	  like	  this.”	  
H:	  “Did	  it	  leave	  a	  mark?”	  
P:	  “No,	  on	  the	  tattoo.”	  	  	  
After	  this,	  they	  start	  talking	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  player’s	  tattoo,	  which	  
reveals	  the	  title	  of	  one	  of	  Almodóvar’s	  movies,	  Tie	  Me	  Up,	  Tie	  Me	  Down.	  
Question	  17,	  the	  last	  question:	  
(22:40:59)	  
H:	  “Have	  you	  ever	  been	  paid	  for	  sex?”	  The	  answer:	  ‘no'.	  The	  answer	  is	  false,”	  	  
sounded	   the	   verdict.	   The	   player	   did	   not	  want	   to	   believe	   it,	   and	   her	   friends	  
were	  also	  incredulous	  in	  the	  background.	  
P:	  “This	  cannot	  be,	  you	  also	  know	  that	  this	  cannot	  be,”	  turning	  to	  her	  friends.	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A	  relative	  of	  the	  player:	  “This	  is	  stupid!”	  
P:	  “No.”	  
H:	  “This	  is	  what	  the	  polygraph	  showed.”	  
P:	  “I	   know,	   I	   know	   that	   I	   cannot	  question	   this,	  but	   this	   is	  probably	   such	  an	  
embarrassing	   question	   in	   itself	   that	   when	   you	   hear	   it,	   and	   you	   are	   also	  
nervous,	  that	  why	  would	  the	  person	  asking	  the	  question	  assume	  this?”	  
H:	   “Unfortunately,	   you	   answered	   16	   questions,	   I	   am	   very	   sorry,	   but	   thank	  
you	  very	  much	  for	  being	  here.”	  
	  
	  	  The	  player	  was	  standing	  for	  a	  while	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  stage,	  puzzled.	  She	  
did	   not	   want	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   game	   really	   ended	   like	   that.	   Her	   friend	  
waved,	  then	  she	  was	  told	  to	  go	  off	  the	  stage,	  and	  she	  left	  the	  set.	  The	  next	  
footage	  showed	  the	  player	  sobbing	   in	  the	  arms	  of	  her	   friend,	  as	  her	   friend,	  
embracing	   her,	  was	   trying	   to	   comfort	   the	   devastated	   girl.	   The	   camera	  was	  
continuously	  following	  the	  player,	  and	  we	  could	  witness,	  as	  her	  friends	  went	  
up	  to	  her	  and	  escorted	  out	  their	  sobbing	  friend.	  
	  	  The	   viewers	   could	   barely	   come	   to	   their	   senses	   from	   the	   details	   of	   the	  
dramatic	  breakdown	  of	  the	  first	  player,	  and	  the	  next	  player	  was	  already	  up,	  
who	  in	  the	  next	  minutes	  had	  to	  face—in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  great	  amusement	  
of	  the	  audience—no	  less	  embarrassing	  questions.	  
	  
In	  the	  statement	  of	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision,	  the	  NRTC	  found	  that	  the	  game	  show	  	  
	  
conveys	   that	   human	   personality	   has	   no	   integral,	   untouchable	   realms,	   and	  
that	   human	   beings	   can	   be	   transparently	   humiliated,	   The	   program's	  
participants	  sign	  up	  to	  reveal	  the	  innermost	  circles	  of	  their	  private	  lives	  for	  a	  
monetary	  prize,	  and	  thus,	  the	  program	  carries	  the	  message	  that	  privacy	  and	  
human	  dignity	  are	  not	  inviolable	  and.	  for	  material	  interest,	  they	  can	  be	  made	  
public	  and	  consumable.	  	  
	  
The	   operative	   part	   of	   the	   decision	   suspended	   the	   broadcasting	   license	   of	   the	   television	  
media	  service	  provider	  for	  30	  minutes.	  
	  
This	   interpretation	   is	   in	   line	   with	   the	   necessary	   separation	   of	   individual	   rights	   and	  
institutional	  protection,	  and	  it	  provides	  the	  “abstract”	  interpretation	  of	  human	  dignity	  with	  
a	  new	  meaning	  (i.e.	  that	  it	  can	  be	  and	  should	  be	  distinguished	  from	  violations	  of	  individual	  
rights).	  The	  need	  for	  institutional	  protection	  can	  be	  established	  in	  connection	  with	  content	  
conveying	   such	   messages	   because	   these	   programs	   question	   the	   fundamental	   value	   of	  
human	  dignity,	  and	  with	  this,	  they	  indirectly	  challenge	  the	  democratic	  rule	  of	  law.	  
	  
The	  opinion	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Supreme	  Court,	  reviewing	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  authority	  (case	  
no.	   Kfv.	   III.37.915/2009/6),	   analyses	   in	   detail	   whether	   any	   unavoidable	   personal	   rights	  
violations	  occurred	  in	  the	  programme.	  With	  this	  respect	  the	  opinion	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	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the	   essence	   of	   the	   “game”	   is	   that	   the	   player	   in	   the	   given	   situation	  
considers—when	  the	  question	  is	  asked—whether	  they	  wish	  to	  respond.	  This	  
decision	   involves	   the	  player’s	  actual	  consent	  concerning	   the	   revelation	  of	  a	  
private	  secret	  to	  the	  public.	  If	  the	  player	  tells	  the	  truth,	  with	  that,	  they	  give	  
their	   consent,	   but	   if	   they	   do	   not	   reveal	   their	   private	   secret	   the	   general	  
consent	   given	   earlier	   cannot	   be	   regarded	   as	   consent	   either,	   because	   the	  
player	   has	   withdrawn	   it.	   It	   follows	   from	   this	   that	   when,	   according	   to	   the	  
host,	   the	  answer	   is	   false	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  scenarios.	  Either	  the	  player	  
lied	  indeed,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  real	  information	  takes	  place	  
against	   the	   will	   of	   the	   player,	   violating	   their	   right	   to	   informational	   self-­‐
determination,	  or	  the	  polygraph	  was	  wrong.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  program	  
conveys	  false	  information	  to	  the	  viewers	  about	  the	  person	  concerned	  which,	  
being	   their	   innermost	   private	   secret,	   means	   the	   violation	   of	   their	   right	   to	  
reputation.	  In	  these	  instances,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  logically	  impossible	  to	  prevent	  
the	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  reputation.	  
	  
The	  reasoning	  of	  both	  the	  NRTC	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  are	  acceptable,	  according	  to	  which	  
there	  was	  no	  “‘escape	   route”	   for	  human	  dignity	   in	   the	  program.	  They	  either	   reveal	   their	  
innermost	   secrets	   or	   they	   try	   to	   keep	   them	   secret	   but,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   lie	   detector	  will	  
indirectly	   reveal	   them.	   The	   decisions	   of	   the	   authority	   and	   the	   court	   agreed	   that	   the	  
violation	  of	  personal	  rights	  was	  unavoidable	  in	  the	  program.	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court—in	   accordance	   with	   the	   holding	   of	   the	   authority’s	  
decision—the	   violation	   of	   dignity	   was	   realized	   by	   the	   “message”	   of	   the	   program.	   The	  
reasoning	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   opinion	   cites	   in	   agreement	   the	   2007	   opinion	   of	   the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  and	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  media	  service	  provider	  plaintiff,	  according	  
to	  which	  (quote	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  opinion):	  	  
	  
[the	  examination	  of	   the	  violation	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  human	  dignity]	  does	  
not	  mean	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   individual	   violations	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  
specific	  legal	  entities	  but	  the	  examination	  of	  whether	  the	  subject,	  nature	  and	  
perspective	  of	  the	  programme	  violated	  the	  fundamental	  values	  manifesting	  
in	   human	   rights.	   .	   .	   .	   The	   Hungarian	   Supreme	   Court	   adopted	   the	   starting	  
point	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court,	   and	   thus	   that	   of	   the	   plaintiff,	   that	   the	  
decision	   of	   the	   defendant	   [authority]	   established	   the	   violation	   of	   the	   first	  
clause	  of	  Article	  3(2)	  of	  the	  Radio	  and	  Television	  Broadcasting	  Act	  based	  not	  
on	   violations	   of	   individual	   rights	   but	   based	   on	   the	   subject,	   nature	   and	  
perspective	  of	  the	  programme.	  
	  
According	  to	  our	  position,	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  dignity	  under	  the	  media	  
regulations,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  individual	  (personal)	  rights	  is	  not	  necessary.	  
Decision	  No.	   721/2010	   (XII.	   8)	   of	   the	  Media	   Council	   states	   this	   clearly:	   “media	   authority	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proceedings	   initiated	  for	   the	  examination	  of	  specific	  violations	  of	  personal	   rights	  and	  the	  
violations	   of	   the	   provisions	   contained	   in	   Article	   3(2)	   of	   the	   Radio	   and	   Television	  
Broadcasting	   Act	   are	   distinct	   from	   each	   other;	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   violation	   of	   this	  
provision	  may	  also	  be	  established	  even	   if	   there	   is	  no	  pending	   litigation	  before	  a	  court	   in	  
connection	  with	  the	  violation	  of	  personal	  rights—for	  any	  reasons	  (e.g.	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  
person	  concerned	  to	  the	  broadcasting	  of	  the	  program	  or	  failure	  to	  file	  a	  complaint)	  or	  even	  
if	  the	  court	  found	  that	  no	  violation	  of	  personal	  rights	  had	  taken	  place”.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  
can	   be	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   violation	   if	   the	   violation	   of	  
individual	   rights	   in	   the	   program	   is	   unavoidable.	   This	   is	   because	   it	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   good	  
reason	  for	  the	  suspicion	  that	  the	  violation	  of	  dignity	  has	  occurred.	  As	  such,	  the	  necessary	  
violation	   of	   individual	   rights	   may	   indicate	   that	   the	   violation	   of	   dignity	   under	   the	  media	  
regulations	   has	   occurred,	   but	   it	   is	   by	   no	   means	   the	   condition,	   in	   a	   general	   sense,	   for	  
establishing	  the	  latter.	  
	  
	  
G.	  The	  Cohn-­‐Bendit	  and	  Lomnici	  cases	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   segments	   of	   the	   program	   on	   channel	   m1	   of	   Magyar	   Televízió	   (Hungarian	  
Television)	  entitled	  Híradó	  (News),	  broadcasted	  on	  1	  April	  2011,	  featured	  a	  report	  on	  the	  
press	   conference	   in	   connection	  with	  Hungary’s	  draft	   constitution	  by	  Daniel	   Cohn-­‐Bendit,	  
the	   representative	  of	   the	  European	  Green	  Party.	   From	  the	   report	   it	  appeared	   that	  Cohn-­‐
Bendit	   refused	   to	   answer	   a	   question	   regarding	   earlier	   pedophilia	   allegations	   he	   was	  
accused	  of	  and	  fled	  the	  press	  conference.	  The	  Media	  Council—despite	  viewer	  complaints—
did	  not	   initiate	  administrative	  proceedings	  for	  alleged	  violations	  of	  human	  dignity.	   In	  one	  
of	   the	   segments	   of	   the	   news	   program	   entitled	   Híradó	   	   broadcasted	   on	   Duna	   Televízió	  
(Danube	   Television)	   on	   3	   December	   2011,	   and	   on	   the	   same	   day	   on	   channel	   m1	   of	  
Hungarian	   Television,	   the	   face	   of	   Zoltán	   Lomnici,	   former	   President	   of	   the	   Hungarian	  
Supreme	  Court	  was	  pixilated,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  viewers	  were	  unaware	  that	  he	  attended	  
the	   event	   which	   was	   reported	   in	   the	   story.	   The	   Media	   Council	   did	   not	   initiate	  
administrative	  proceedings	  for	  the	  violation	  of	  human	  dignity	  in	  this	  case	  either.	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   authority,	   no	   institutional	   violation	   of	   human	   dignity	   took	  
place	  in	  the	  Cohn-­‐Bendit	  and	  Lomnici	  cases.	  It	  can	  be	  stated	  in	  general	  that	  false	  reporting	  
about	  important	  events	  diminishes	  the	  faith	  in	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  media	  and	  especially	  
in	   the	   ethos	   of	   public	   service	   media.	   False	   reporting	   also	   restricts	   the	   viewers’	   right	   to	  
adequate	   information	   and	   raises	   the	   issue	   of	   violation	   of	   the	   personal	   rights	   of	   the	  
individuals	  concerned.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  violate	  human	  dignity	  protected	  under	  
the	  media	   regulations.	   Although	   the	   viewers’	   right	   to	   information	   is	   violated	   if	   they	   see	  
something	  on	  the	  screen	  that	  is	  different	  to	  what	  actually	  happened,	  the	  “message”	  of	  the	  
program	  affected	  by	  this	   fact	  however	  does	  not	  necessarily	  transmit	  such	  content,	  which	  
would	  then	  amount	  to	  the	  gravity	  of	  dignity	  violation.	  	  
	  
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  14	  No.	  07 842	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
The	  Cohn-­‐Bendit	   case	  appeared	   in	   the	  context	  of	  a	  major	  public	   (political)	  debate,	  which	  
inherently	   requires	   a	   different	   approach	   from	   the	   authority	   applying	   the	   law	   as	   the	  
assessment	  of	  content	  destroying	  the	  culture	  of	  human	  dignity.	  This	  is	  because,	  in	  political	  
debates,	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  has	  a	  broader	  scope	  of	  latitude.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  political	  
events	  (in	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  editing	  of	  a	  press	  conference	  is	  considered	  as	  such),	  Article	  
14	  of	  the	  Press	  Freedom	  Act	  can	  only	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  very	  narrow	  scope.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Lomnici	  case	  raises	  different	  types	  of	   issues.	  This	   is	  because,	   in	  a	  
political	  sense,	  the	  former	  chief	  judge	  is	  clearly	  a	  neutral	  public	  figure,	  and,	  therefore,	  we	  
cannot	   suspect	   there	   to	   be,	   behind	   the	   pixilation	   of	   Mr.	   Lomnici	   in	   the	   footage,	   an	  
intention	   to	   express	   political	   or	   public	   opinion.	   (According	   to	   news	   bites,	   there	   were	  
personal	  reasons	  behind	  the	  pixilation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  blatant	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  
manipulation	   was	   carried	   out	   raises	   the	   suspicion	   of	   provocation,	   but	   both	   “rumours”	  
remained	  unconfirmed).	  As	  such,	  Mr.	  Lomnici,	  the	  former	  chief	  judge’s	  right	  to	  reputation	  
might	   have	   been	   violated,	   because	   the	   audience	   did	   not	   receive—indirect—information	  
about	   his	   participation	   in	   a	   public	   event.	   Following	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   scandal,	   this	  
generated	  the	  impression	  that	  he	  was	  some	  sort	  of	  a	  persona	  non	  grata	  in	  public	  life,	  who	  
is	  not	  worthy	   to	  appear	  on	   television.	   (The	  story	   is	  qualified	  by	   the	   fact	   that,	  before	  and	  
also	   after	   the	   incriminating	   report,	   he	  was	   invited	   on	   several	   occasions	   by	   public	  media	  
outlets,	  so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  any	  tendencies	  behind	  his	  one-­‐time	  pixilation.	  However,	  an	  
offence	  can	  be	  committed	  by	  one-­‐time	  conduct,	  too.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  
out	  that	  the	  gain	  obtained	   in	  the	  “marketplace	  of	  opinions”	  by	  the	  pixilation	   is	  not	  really	  
visible;	   in	  other	  words,	  this	  editorial	  action	  could	  only	  influence	  public	  visibility	  to	  a	  small	  
extent).	  
	  
Naturally,	   falsification	   is	   unacceptable,	   even	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   highly	   protected	  
expression	  of	  political	  opinion.	  	  The	  violation	  of	  the	  reputation	  or	  integrity	  of	  the	  persons	  
concerned	   in	   these	   cases	   could	   have	   been	   taken	   place,	   but	   the	   violation	   of	   human	  
dignity—especially,	   in	   the	   above	   analyzed	   “institutional”	   sense—according	   to	   the	  
authority’s	  decision,	  requires	  more	  severe	  conduct.	  What	  is	  certain,	  however,	  is	  that	  if	  we	  
accept	  that	  the	  violation	  of	  any	  human	  or	  personal	  rights	  stemming	  from	  human	  dignity	  is	  
sufficient	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  human	  dignity,	  we	  would	  significantly	  devalue	  the	  
concept	  of	  human	  dignity	  itself.	  
	  
Of	  course,	   it	   is	  not	   impossible	  to	   imagine	  a	  violation	  of	  an	   individual	  right	  of	  such	  gravity	  
that	   it	  would	   invoke	   the	   need	   for	   the	   institutional	   protection	   of	   dignity.	   In	   this	   case	   the	  
offensive	  content	  is	  “separated”	  from	  the	  victims	  who	  suffered	  the	  specific	  violation,	  and	  
the	   conduct	   would	   violate	   the	   respect	   (or,	   according	   to	   the	   2011	   opinion	   of	   the	  
Constitutional	   Court,	   the	   “culture”)	   of	   human	   dignity.	   However,	   a	   false	   statement	  
published	   in	   the	  media	   (even	   if	   it	   is	   broadcasted	   by	   visual	  means),	   does	   not	   necessarily	  
result	  in	  the	  violation	  of	  dignity.	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The	  protection	  of	  human	  dignity	  under	   the	  media	   regulations	   is	   an	   issue	  not	   completely	  
resolved.	  The	  interpretation	  outlined	  in	  the	  present	  study—based	  on	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  
the	  Constitutional	   Court	   and	  other	   courts,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   authority—wished	   to	  provide	   a	  
coherent	   content	   for	   the	   provision	   at	   issue,	   a	   content	   that	   respects	   the	   freedom	  of	   the	  
press	   as	  well	   as	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   separation	   of	   different	   areas	   of	   the	   law.	   Human	  
dignity	  is	  today	  a	  “fashionable”	  legal	  concept	  and	  frequently	  serves	  as	  a	  basis	  of	  reference.	  
However,	   several	   aspects	   of	   the	   concept	   still	   require	   further	   analyses.	   The	   need	   for	  
appropriate	   interpretation	   is	   amplified	   by	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   content	   of	   profit-­‐oriented	  
media	  outlets,	  which	  often	  deny	  or	  neglect	  the	  principle	  of	  human	  dignity.	  As	  is	  apparent	  
from	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  authority	  and	  their	  reception,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  this	  issue,	  the	  legal	  
analysis	  of	  content	  in	  connection	  with	  or	  published	  in	  the	  context	  of	  political	  questions	  is	  
controversial.	   Although	   regulation	   or	   enforcement	   cannot	   provide	   completely	   satisfying	  
and	  effective	  answers	  to	  these	  problems,	  they	  can	  significantly	  contribute	  to	  the	  resolution	  
of	  them.	  
	  
 
